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Abstract
We investigate regime-dependent Granger causality between real output, inflation
and monetary indicators and map with U.S. Fed Chairperson’s tenure since 1965. While
all monetary indicators have causal predictive content in certain time periods, we report
that the Federal Funds rate (FFR) and Domestic Money (DM) are substitutes in their
role as lead or feedback variables to explain variations in real output and inflation. We
provide a comprehensive account of evolution of causal relationships associated with
all US Fed Chairpersons we consider.
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1. Introduction
The Federal Reserve Act mandates the Federal Reserve to conduct monetary policy ‘so as
to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-
term interest rates’. Post World War II period monetary policy consensus and its evolution
can be summarized by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s decisions to adjust short-term interest
rates procyclically in small but persistent steps with the intention of controlling the credit
available in the economy and in a way that will offset sustained deviations of output growth
from its potential. Each U.S. Federal Reserve Chairperson had more or less the same policy
toolkit to achieve same objectives as described by the mandate. Given this background, at
least in principle, unless there are shifts in policy preferences (objectives and/or instruments)
or expectations formation, there are no obvious reasons to expect an overlap in shifts in the
causal relationships between alternative policy instruments and key macroeconomic variables
(causality regimes) corresponding to a particular U.S. Fed’s Chairperson’s tenure.
There is a good deal of research, that utilizes classical or Bayesian methods, investigating
the evolution of the U.S. monetary policy that focuses explicitly on the Federal Funds rate
(FFR) or an equivalent short-term rate measure. For instance, in their influential work
Sims and Zha (2006) argue that while there are no changes in the parameters of the FFR
based Taylor rule, there are significant shifts in the volatility of structural disturbances
such as the Volcker reserves-targeting period. Davig and Doh (2014) find that a more
aggressive FFR regime was in place after the Volcker disinflation and before 1970 than
during the Great Inflation episode of the 1970s. They suggest that the timing of the different
regimes is associated with variations in the inflation persistence. The assumption that FFR
approximates well the stand of the U.S. monetary policy also means that there is relatively
little concern for alternative measures of liquidity and credit in the economy. It also means
that the direction of causality between these other potential policy variables, such as the
causal liquidity effects, are often a side issue. Given the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) problems
since December 2008 and the wide ranging utilization of unconventional monetary policy
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measures as well as forward guidance, the appropriateness of the level of FFR as an accurate
measure of the U.S. monetary policy stand has been subject to close scrutiny (Kocherlakota
(2019)).
In this paper we aim to shed some light on the historical causality regimes of the U.S.
monetary policy and the role of the seven U.S. Fed chairpersons throughout the sample period
from 1965 to 2016. Most existing literature, as in for instance Clarida et al. (2000), estimates
policy rules based on the structural break premise around early 1980’s, when U.S. Federal
Reserve under the chairmanship of Volcker implemented contractionary monetary policies.
In this paper we use endogenous regime identification methods and do not impose any
assumption on the dates of causal regime change. We first assess the U.S. monetary policy
conduct and investigate the multivariate causal relationships. Regime Dependent Granger
Causality, henceforth referred to as simply causality, between real output, inflation and a
series of monetary indicators, in addition to the FFR, is examined using a particular type
of Markov switching vector autoregressive (MS-VAR) model that endogenously determines
the causal regimes. In particular, we focus on U.S. Domestic Money (DM) (to be defined
later on) next to FFR to account for controllable liquidity developments that are not subject
to ZLB problem. We identify episodes of causation from: (i) FFR and DM to real output
and/or inflation; (ii) from real output and/or inflation to FFR and DM; we also identify
episodes of no such causal relationships. Second, we map these identified nonlinear causality
regimes with the corresponding U.S. Fed’s Chairperson’s tenure. The mapping allows us
to evaluate changes in possible policy instrument preferences (FFR or DM) associated with
the policymaker in charge of the U.S. monetary policy at the time. Our aim is to explicitly
focus on the time-varying nonlinear causal information content in two potential monetary
policy instruments, FFR and DM, to explain variations in U.S. real output and inflation
and vice versa; hence the use of the notion of regime-dependent Granger causality. As
discussed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) at length, it is important to note that the presence
or absence of a statistically significant causal relationship does not necessarily indicate shifts
in the objectives of the U.S. Federal Reserve or whether the monetary policymaking became
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more or less effective, or in the case of causal feedback rules, whether policy instruments
successfully accommodate macroeconomic variations.
We first compute smoothed regime probabilities for monetary indicators (FFR and DM)
upon which the Federal Reserve has direct control. We find that, while both policy indicators
have some causal predictive content for real output and inflation in certain time periods, these
are mostly substitutes in their role as causal lead or feedback variables when used to analyze
real output and inflation. That means, broadly speaking, that, when the Federal Funds rate
is causally leading inflation and/or output, Domestic Money is not a leading variable, and
vice versa.
Second, to give a macroeconomic policy interpretation to our identified regimes, we map
these to the corresponding tenures of U.S. Fed chairperson by defining the dominant regimes
as the one that prevails at least 75% (or 90%) of the time the relevant chairperson was
in office. Output regimes: Burns and Volcker in the 1970’s and 1980’s, respectively, and
Bernanke-Yellen (90% of the time) episodes can be characterized as output regimes where
the FFR causally leads real output. In contrast, Martin’s 1960’s and Greenspan’s tenures
are dominated by output regimes where DM causally leads real output. Inflation regimes:
We find that DM was causal for inflation variations throughout Martin-Burns-Miller-Volcker
tenures without any interruption in the regime identification. There is very little inform-
ation in FFR to explain inflation variations except during the Burns-Miller tenures in the
1970’s, confirming the widely reported failure of FFR to explain variations in inflation (see,
for instance, Stock and Watson (2007), Stock and Watson (2010) and Faust and Wright
(2013), who report strong forecasting performance of univariate models of inflation against
economic model based alternatives). Monetary Rule regimes: We find few episodes that jus-
tify McCallum or Taylor type feedback regimes. Miller-Volcker tenures can be represented
as a Taylor type monetary policy regime and the Bernanke-Yellen tenures are identified as
McCallum type feedback regimes. Meltzer (2014) suggested that the Federal Reserve fol-
lowed successful Taylor rule policies after 1985. While there are certain subperiods during
Volcker’s and Greenspan’s chairmanships that are found to be associated with Taylor type
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feedback rules, with the exception of the Bernanke-Yellen periods, we do not find strong
empirical support (i.e. more than 75% of tenure duration) for Meltzer (2014)’s claims.
Third, we compute causal regime durations associated with monetary indicators and
macroeconomic variables. Our calculations strongly favour DM over FFR and alternative
monetary indicators, meaning that regimes in which DM is identified as a causal variable
in explaining variations in real output and/or inflation tend to be significantly longer than
regimes associated with other monetary indicators.
Finally, we conduct empirical and computational robustness tests of our results. We
repeat the exercise for two alternative and potentially useful monetary indicators upon which
the Federal Reserve has no direct control: M2 and Divisia M4, a certain measure of the
synthetic Divisia index1. Using a measure of 75% (alternatively 90%) of dominating regime
during a Fed chairperson tenure, we find that both monetary indicators have a significant
causal lead at the start of Volcker’s chairmanship. We also find that Divisia M4 was causally
leading inflation during most of Greenspan’s tenure. Most significantly, Divisia M4 is strongly
associated with Monetary Rule behaviour, successfully accounting for a McCallum type rule
during the Volcker and Greenspan periods. M2 serves as a monetary rule dominant regime
during the Martin and Bernanke-Yellen periods. We also carry out Monte Carlo simulations
to verify the accuracy of our causal regime identification strategy and confirm that identified
regimes are not spurious.
Related Literature
Our work is related to the extensive empirical literature concerned with the linear re-
lationships between monetary aggregates, real output and/or inflation. In their seminal
work, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argued that long leads and lags determine the asso-
ciation between monetary aggregates, real output and inflation. However, in an influential
paper Friedman and Kuttner (1992) reported that the information content of U.S. mon-
etary aggregates to explain real output and inflation has mostly disappeared after Volcker
1This index is a discrete-time approximation of a monetary aggregate as a function of the weighted
average of the growth rates of the component quantities and so called Divisia weights that take into account
the opportunity cost of holding a dollar’s worth of an asset against the yield of a benchmark asset, held only
to carry wealth between different time periods. See Barnett (1980) for details.
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disinflation policies, whereas short term rates remained as useful information variables in
explaining variations in real output undermining the confidence in the use of monetary ag-
gregates as intermediate targets. In contrast, Aksoy and Piskorski (2006, 2005) argued that
U.S. monetary aggregates are subject to major measurement problems since money supply
data includes substantial and unstable foreign holdings of the U.S. dollars. They show that,
when corrected for foreign holdings of U.S. Dollars, the U.S. Domestic Money has significant
and stable information content for the variations in the U.S. real output and inflation both
in and out of sample. Similarly, Belongia and Ireland (2016) show that Friedman-Schwartz
stylized facts can be replicated when the synthetic money supply measure, Divisia, is used.
Our work is also directly related to the literature that evaluates the causal patterns
between money supply measures and macroeconomic variables at recessions/recoveries and
expansions. Ever since the work of Neftci (1984), it is recognized that business cycles are
asymmetric around recessions and expansions, suggesting that the monetary policy effective-
ness should be different given the state of the business cycle. Psaradakis et al. (2005) directly
address the changing causal relationships by introducing the concept of temporary causality,
where nonlinear causal relationships between money supply measures and real output can
be evaluated within the context of Markov Switching models. Droumaguet et al. (2017)
provide a formal, nevertheless alternative definition of temporary Causality. They develop a
Bayesian framework and extend Krolzig (1997) and Warne (2000). They consider a bench-
mark unrestricted MS-VAR and test the causality on the estimated switching parameters.
Their work is about inference. The switching is governed by main parameters of the VAR
dating expansions and recessions.2,3 The main difference between Droumaguet et al. (2017)
and our approach is that we do not rely upon any inference on the estimated parameters
of the reduced form VAR. Instead, our method constrains the reduced form VAR in order
to identify hidden regimes that are directly associated with different causality relationships.
These regimes encompass all possible directions of causality within the model and transitions
2Similar to Hamilton (1989).
3The inference on the parameters in Markov-Switching models has been subject to criticism (See for
instance Hansen (1992)).
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between them are governed by exogenous unobservable Markov processes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the nonlinear MS-VAR economet-
ric framework with potential monetary instruments, real output and inflation as endogenous
variables and with eight possible causality regimes in the macroeconomic environment. Sec-
tion 3. presents and discusses the results of our causal regimes, duration of regimes and
dominant regimes corresponding to tenures of Fed Chairpersons. Section 4. presents some
robustness results using alternative monetary indictors and Monte Carlo simulations. Fi-
nally, Section 5. concludes.
2. A Model of Temporary Granger Causality
Our analysis is based on a regime switching multivariate model for real output growth (y),
price inflation (pi), and a monetary indicator or interest rate (m). Our modelling approach is
consistent with the notion of temporary Granger causality, that is causality which may hold
during some time periods but not in others. Changes in the causal relationships among the
three endogenous variables of interest are viewed as unobservable random events governed by
an exogenous finite-state Markov process whose state space represents all possible alternative
causal states of nature in a trivariate model. In this respect, the approach to causality that is
considered here is similar to that of Psaradakis et al. (2005) but differs from those of Krolzig
(1997) and Droumaguet et al. (2017). The latter make use of regime switching models in
which different regimes are not identified as being associated with different causality links
and whose state-dependent parameters are not necessarily consistent with the notion of
temporary causality that is the focus of our analysis here. We note that it is well known
that the empirical support for such causal relationships is highly sensitive to the data and
model specification(e.g. Psaradakis et al. (2005)).
7
Formally, we consider a MS-VAR model of order h ≥ 1 of the form
Xt = Dt +
h∑
k=1
A
(k)
t Xt−k + Ω
1/2
t Ut, t = 1, 2, . . . , T, (1)
where X ′t = [yt, pit,mt], Dt and A
(k)
t are state-dependent parameter matrices given by
Dt =

µ10 + µ11sy,t
µ20 + µ21spi,t
µ30 + µ31sm,t
 , A(k)t =

φ
(k)
10 + φ
(k)
11 sy,t ψ
(k)
1 sy,t ψ
(k)
2 sy,t
ψ
(k)
3 spi,t φ
(k)
20 + φ
(k)
21 spi,t ψ
(k)
4 spi,t
ψ
(k)
5 sm,t ψ
(k)
6 sm,t φ
(k)
30 + φ
(k)
31 sm,t
 , (2)
{U ′t = [uy,t, upi,t, um,t]} are uncorrelated Gaussian random vectors with mean zero and identity
covariance matrix, and Ω
1/2
t denotes the lower triangular Cholesky factor of a symmetric
positive definite 3 × 3 matrix Ωt the elements of which depend on (sy,t, spi,t, sm,t) in a way
to be made more precise later. The variables sy,t, spi,t and sm,t are latent binary random
variables with values in {0, 1} which characterize the regime (state) that prevails at each
time period t. The initial values X1−h, . . . , X0 are taken as given.
The model allows for eight causality regimes, which may be indexed by the random
variable
St =

1, if (sy,t, spi,t, sm,t) = (1, 1, 1)
2, if (sy,t, spi,t, sm,t) = (1, 1, 0)
3, if (sy,t, spi,t, sm,t) = (1, 0, 1)
4, if (sy,t, spi,t, sm,t) = (0, 1, 1)
5, if (sy,t, spi,t, sm,t) = (1, 0, 0)
6, if (sy,t, spi,t, sm,t) = (0, 1, 0)
7, if (sy,t, spi,t, sm,t) = (0, 0, 1)
8, if (sy,t, spi,t, sm,t) = (0, 0, 0)
(3)
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The state-dependent covariance matrices Ωt of the noise may be specified accordingly as
Ωt =
8∑
`=1
Ω`I(St = `), (4)
where Ω1, . . . ,Ω8 are symmetric positive definite non-random matrices and I(·) is an indicator
function whose value is 1 when its argument is true and 0 otherwise.
The specification of the model is completed by assuming that the random sequences
{sy,t}, {spi,t} and {sm,t} are homogeneous first-order Markov chains, independent of the
noise {Ut}, with corresponding transition matrices P (r) = [p(r)i,j ], r = y, pi,m, where
p
(r)
i,j = P(sr,t+1 = j|sr,t = i), i, j = 0, 1; r = y, pi,m. (5)
It is further assumed that {sy,t}, {spi,t} and {sm,t} are independent of each other. In con-
sequence, the regime indicators {St} form a homogeneous first-order Markov chain on the
state space {1, 2, . . . , 8} with transition matrix PS = [Pi,j], Pi,j = P(St+1 = j|St = i),
i, j = 1, . . . 8, such that
PS = P
(y) ⊗ P (pi) ⊗ P (m), (6)
where ⊗ denotes Kronecker product. The independence assumption implies that regime
switching in each of the equations of the model is driven by a Markov process which is
independent of the Markov process that controls regime changes in another equation. The
assumption can be relaxed but only at the cost of a substantial increase in the number of
free parameters in what is already a high-dimensional multiple equation model.
Aggregating (Classifying) Regimes: The causal patterns in our trivariate model are dir-
ectly associated with the binary variables (sy,t, spi,t, sm,t).If sr,t = 0 (r = y, pi,m), then the
r-th element of Xt is not Granger caused by either of the other two elements. Since the focus
of the analysis are the temporary causal relationships among the three variables in Xt, defin-
ing the states of nature directly in terms of these causal relationships is arguably a natural
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way of classifying regimes. To this end, and in order to have a parsimonious presentation of
the identified regimes in our discussion, we will aggregate regimes according to a three-way
classification: (i) Output regime (sy,t = 1) is characterized by St = 1, St = 2, St = 3 and
St = 5; (ii) Inflation regime (spi,t = 1) is characterized by St = 1, St = 2, St = 4 and St = 6;
(iii) Monetary Rule regime (sm,t = 1) is characterized by St = 1, St = 3, St = 4 and St = 7.
This aggregation scheme, which is summarized in Table 1 below, is helpful for interpreting
the stylized facts.
(sy,t, spi,t, sm,t)

sy,t =

1, then pi and ∆mt → ∆yt (Output Regime)
0, then pi and ∆mt 9 ∆yt
spi,t =

1, then ∆yt and ∆mt → pi (Inflation Regime)
0, then ∆yt and ∆mt 9 pi
sm,t =

1, then pi and ∆yt → ∆mt (Monetary Rule Regime)
0, then pi and ∆yt 9 ∆mt
(7)
The regime associated with St = 1 is a mutual causation regime in which all three
endogenous variables are causally linked to each other and hence monetary policy indicators
are feedback variables; fundamentally it is the unrestricted reduced form VAR where all
variables impact each other. The regime associated with St = 2, St = 3 and St = 4 are
the regimes where one of the variables follow an autoregressive process (AR) without being
caused by any of the other two. For instance, St = 2 is the regime where the monetary
indicator causes both inflation and GDP growth, however the monetary indicator itself
follows an AR process. St = 5, St = 6 and St = 7 are regimes where two of the variables
have autoregressive dynamics but cause the third one. In particular, the regime associated
with St = 7 may be considered a policy rule regime (McCallum or Taylor) where the policy
indicator is a feedback variable and thus responds to changes in macroeconomic conditions
but with a lag. The regime associated with St = 8 is a no-causation regime in which none
10
P (St = j|Xt; Φ)
j
=︷ ︸︸ ︷
When Granger Causality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
sy,t = 1
pit and ∆mt → ∆yt ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
(Output Regime)
spi,t = 1
∆Yt and ∆mt → pit ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
(Inflation Regime)
sm,t = 1
pit and ∆yt → ∆mt ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
(Monetary Rule Regime)
sy,t = 0 ∆yt ⊕spi,t = 0 pit ∆mt
sm,t = 0 (No Causality)
Note: P (St = j|Xt; Φ) is the smoothed and Φ is the vector of parameters probability
× ×
×
Table 1: Summary of regime aggregation
of the endogenous variables are causally linked to each other.
The parameters of the model defined by equations (1) to (6) can be estimated by the
method of maximum likelihood (ML), using a recursive algorithm analogous to that discussed
in Hamilton (1994, Sec. 22.4) to evaluate the sample log-likelihood. The Broyden–Fletcher–
Goldfarb–Shano (BFGS) quasi-Newton optimization algorithm, with numerically computed
derivatives, is used here to find the ML estimates of the parameters.Standard errors for
estimated parameters are then obtained from the outer-product-of-the-gradient estimate of
the information matrix. We use a second-order model (h = 2) in all cases, a lag structure
which is rich enough to produce residuals which exhibit no signs of significant autocorrelation
on the basis of conventional Ljung–Box portmanteau tests.
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3. Empirical Analysis and Simulations
3.1. Data
Our data set consists of annualized quarterly growth rates (log-differences) in real GDP
(yt) and in the GDP deflator/inflation (pit), as well as quarterly observations on a variety
of monetary indicators (mt). One such indicator is the change (in first-difference) in the
FFR (∆FFR). Specifically, we use the shadow rates, as defined by Wu and Xia (2016),
in order to overcome the difficulties associated with the ZLB period.4 When assessing the
relevance of monetary indicators, we take a nuanced stand by distinguishing those that
the Federal Reserve can directly control from those it cannot. Therefore as an alternative
monetary instrument, we use annualized quarterly changes (log-differences) in DM (∆DM).
We include DM as the monetary aggregate as the monetary instrument (currency component
of monetary aggregate corrected for foreign holdings of U.S. Dollars) as it has at least two
important properties: first it is the monetary aggregate that comes closest to a monetary
aggregate as a policy instrument: First, the Federal Reserve knows exactly how much it
prints money and tracks closely U.S. Dollar shipments abroad (Porter and Judson (1996));
second, it has a desirable information content to predict U.S. inflation and real output
(Aksoy and Piskorski (2006, 2005)). While FFR and DM can be considered as potential
policy instruments upon which the Federal Reserve can exert direct control, the monetary
aggregate M2 and the Divisia indices are monetary/financial variables reflecting variations
in U.S. wide financial activities and state of the credit upon which the Federal Reserve has
only indirect influence. We include Divisia measures in our monetary indicators as these are
shown to be useful in forecasting changes in key U.S. macroeconomic aggregates (Belongia
and Ireland (2015)). In Section 4.1. we will compare our FFR and DM results with M2
(∆M2), and in a synthetic Divisia measure,namely Divisia M4 (∆DivisiaM4). The data
cover the period 1965:1 to 2015:4, except for Divisia M4 for which data is only available
4The use of rates which are almost zero for long periods presented a serious challenge for the numerical
optimisation routines used to estimate the parameters of the model.
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from 1967:1 onwards.5,6
Our sample overlaps with seven chairs who served at the Federal Reserve: William M.
Martin (April 2, 1951 to February 1, 1970) appointed by Harry Truman, Arthur F. Burns
(February 1, 1970 to January 31, 1978) appointed by Richard Nixon, G. William Miller
(March 8, 1978 to August 6, 1979 ) and Paul Volcker (August 6, 1979 to August 11, 1987)
both appointed by Jimmy Carter, Alan Greenspan (August 11, 1987 to January 31, 2006)
appointed by Ronald Reagan, Ben Bernanke (February 1, 2006 to January 31, 2014) appoin-
ted by George W. Bush, and Janet Yellen (February 3, 2014 to February 3, 2018) appointed
by Barack Obama.
3.2. Parameter Estimates
We begin by reporting in Table 2 full-sample estimates of the parameters that are directly
related to the causal link, that is, ψ
(k)
1 , . . . , ψ
(k)
6 , k = 1, 2. Estimates of the remaining
parameters of the various models and the value of the maximized log-likelihood function
can be found in Tables 13 and 14 in Appendix B. We note that the estimates of the
transition probabilities (p
(r)
i,j ) and of the intercepts in Dt are highly significant. In addition,
the estimates reveal significant persistence in real output in models with ∆FFR but no
persistence in the model with ∆DM . Inflation is persistent in both FFR and DM models.
Money-output causal parameters (ψ
(k)
2 ) are significant for both ∆FFR and ∆DM for
the first lag and thus these have in-sample predictive content for output. Similarly, money-
inflation causality parameters (ψ
(k)
4 ) are significant and variations in both FFR and DM
temporarily cause price inflation. The parameters ψ
(k)
5 and ψ
(k)
6 are associated with the
monetary indicator feedback, as in variants of the McCallum (∆DM) or Taylor rule (∆FFR)
for real output and inflation, respectively. We find that the estimated output-money feedback
parameter (ψ
(1)
5 ) is significant for both FFR and DM. Inflation-money feedback parameters
(ψ
(k)
6 ) are significant only for ∆DM . It is interesting to note that there is little evidence for
5For more details on the data see the appendix 1.1.
6We note that the hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected by a breakpoint unit root test with innovative
outlier, at the 5% significance level, for all variables under consideration; see Appendix 2.5. for descriptive
statistics and unit root tests.
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Taylor Regimes: ∆FFR responses to past inflation are not significant.
Causal Effect FFR ∆DM
pit → yt
ψ
(1)
1
0.1315 -0.1863
(0.3366) (0.2434)
ψ
(2)
1
-0.1294 -0.0484
(0.3177) (0.2261)
mt → yt
ψ
(1)
2
0.3605*** 0.2215***
(0.2125) (0.0642)
ψ
(2)
2
-0.3236 -0.0051
(0.2736) (0.0654)
yt → pit
ψ
(1)
3
-0.0078 -0.0633
(0.0497) (0.0414)
ψ
(2)
3
0.0691 0.0784*
(0.0525) (0.0375)
mt → pit
ψ
(1)
4
0.1692 -0.0501
(0.1505) (0.0458)
ψ
(2)
4
0.4785* 0.1023*
(0.1494) (0.0452)
yt → mt
ψ
(1)
5
0.1108** -0.5190***
(0.0512) (0.0615)
ψ
(2)
5
0.1703* -0.1744
(0.0356) (0.1119)
pit → mt
ψ
(1)
6
0.0955 -0.3754***
(0.2002) (0.2206)
ψ
(2)
6
0.1110 1.0423***
(0.2316) (0.2212)
Note: * , **, *** are respectively 5%, 1% and 0.1% significance
Standard errors in the brackets
Table 2: Results for Causality Parameters
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3.3. Regime Probabilities
Estimates reported in Table 2 provide only partial evidence of causal relationships. In
this section we compute smoothed probabilities (based on the full sample information) of
being in the output, inflation, monetary rule or non-causality regimes described in Section
2. For the sake of direct comparison we present in Figure 1 estimated probabilities for FFR
and DM models together.7
We can sketch some broad contours for smoothed probabilities for all models. We first
comment on Figure 1. Then, given that regimes switch quite often, in Section 3.4., we map
the smoothed probabilities to tenures of Fed Reserve chairpersons and compute the dominant
regime (75% or 90% of the tenure duration) for each policy indicator. That way we have a
straightforward interpretation of the computed regimes and monetary policy.
First, estimated regime probabilities for the monetary indicators FFR and DM upon
which the Federal Reserve has direct control reveal that throughout the sample period con-
trollable monetary indicators causally affect output or inflation or serve as a feedback vari-
able. However, we note that business cycle causal regimes mostly switch across monetary
indicators. This means, for instance, that when FFR leads real output, DM in general does
not and vice versa.
Specifically, we can distinguish three broad real output regimes: starting from the tenure
of Martin, tenures of Burns and Miller were characterized by temporary causality from FFR
to real output. This is followed by Volcker and Greenspan tenures up to 1998 where DM
causally leads real output that is in turn followed from 2001 onwards by real output regimes
where FFR predominantly leads real output including the latter part of Greenspan, Bernanke
and Yellen services.
Second, we identify two inflation regimes where either DM causally leads inflation and
where it does not. Martin-Burns-Miller-Volcker and Greenspan up until the 1990 recession
7Specifically these are the sums of estimated smoothed probabilities associated with the relevant states
in the ∆FFR model (Figure 3 in the Appendix), the ∆DM model (Figure 4 in the Appendix). We also
report in Figure 2 smooth probabilities for those variables where Federal Reserve has only indirect control
(∆M2 and ∆DivisiaM4)
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DM causally leads inflation. After 1990’s there is only scant evidence of either DM or FFR
causally leading inflation. We note that there is very little evidence of FFR being a causal
variable for inflation confirming widely reported failure of FFR alone to explain variations
in inflation (see, for instance, Stock and Watson (2007, 2010) and Faust and Wright (2013)).
Third, our analysis indicates that FFR is intermittently a feedback variable (Taylor rule)
up until early 2000’s that includes Martin-Burns-Miller-Volcker tenures and some episodes
of Greenspan era. While as described above the DM is temporary causal for real output and
inflation, we only find relevance of DM as a feedback variable to real output and inflation
developments (McCallum rule) starting with Greenspan’s latter part of service, followed by
Bernanke-Yellen tenures associated with the financial crisis and aftermath. To complement
this we find fairly strong support for McCallum rules up until the 2000’s. While there
are certain subperiods during Volcker and Greenspan chairmanship that reveal Taylor rule
type feedback rules, with the exception of Bernanke-Yellen periods we do not find strong
systematic support for Meltzer (2014)’s claims. Several episodes of Miller, Burns and earlier
part of Volcker tenures were also characterized by Taylor rules and these were in conjunction
with causal lead regimes of DM to explain variations in both U.S. real output and inflation.
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Figure 1: Smoothed Probabilities for Policy Instruments: ‘Output Regime’ (St = 1, 2, 3, 5), where the relevant monetary policy
indicator causally leads US real output, a ‘Inflation Regime’ (St = 1, 2, 4, 6), where the relevant monetary policy indictor causally
leads price inflation, a ‘Monetary Rule Regime’ (St = 1, 3, 4, 7), where US real output and/or price inflation lead the monetary policy
indicator and finally the ‘Non-Causality Regime’ (St = 8) where none of the variables are causally linked to each other
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3.4. Dominant Regimes
Following Hamilton (1989), we consider the regime associated with St = `, ` = 1, . . . , 8, to
be the prevailing regime at time t if the smoothed regime probability P(St = `|X1−h, ..., XT ; θˆ),
based on the ML estimate θˆ of the model’s parameters, exceeds 1/2. Using this rule, we
report in Table 3 the total number of quarters in which each of the four composite regimes
described in Section 3.3. (namely, output, price, monetary rule, and non-causality) prevailed.
FFR ∆DM
Output Regime 121 129
Inflation Regime 57 139
Monetary Rule Regime 97 66
Non-Causality Regime 14 10
Table 3: Number of Quarters Associated with Each Regime
It can be seen that the number of quarters associated with the non-causality regime is
lower than that associated with any of the other three aggregate regimes. The price regime
(output regime) appears to be the most prevalent one in models that involve DM (FFR).
We also compute the estimated expected duration of each of these four regimes. Letting
PˆS = [Pˆi,j], i, j = 1, . . . 8, denote the ML estimate of the transition matrix of {St}, the expec-
ted durations of the output, price, monetary rule, and non-causality regimes are estimated
as:
Output : (1− Pˆ1,1)−1 + (1− Pˆ2,2)−1 + (1− Pˆ3,3)−1 + (1− Pˆ5,5)−1,
Price : (1− Pˆ1,1)−1 + (1− Pˆ2,2)−1 + (1− Pˆ4,4)−1 + (1− Pˆ6,6)−1,
Monetary Rule : (1− Pˆ1,1)−1 + (1− Pˆ3,3)−1 + (1− Pˆ4,4)−1 + (1− Pˆ7,7)−1,
Non-causality : (1− Pˆ8,8)−1.
Similarly to the results in Table 3, the estimated expected durations shown in Table 4
also indicate that the non-causality regime is expected to last the shortest. Regimes other
than the non-causality regime exhibit the longest expected durations in a model with DM.
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FFR ∆DM
Output Regime 24.52 26.19
Inflation Regime 17.15 27.54
Monetary Rule Regime 23.68 24.95
Non-Causality Regime 3.48 5.94
Table 4: Conditional Expected Duration (Quarters)
The expected duration varies from 14 (non-causality) to 121 quarters (output) in the model
with the FFR, to 10 (non-causality) to 139 quarters (inflation) in the model with the DM.
An alternative way of looking at the separation of causality regimes is by focusing on
which regime has been the dominant regime during a Chairperson’s mandate. More spe-
cifically, using the notion of a Dominant Regime, we can compute the proportion of quarters
that a specific regime has dominated a mandate. For instance, during Greenspan’s mandate,
which lasted for 74 quarters, the output regime prevailed for 19 quarters in the case of FFR,
which is approximately 25.6% of that mandate. The entire period from Martin’s to Volcker’s
mandates was dominated by the Inflation Regime in the case of DM.8
Table 5 displays dominant regimes that we match with tenures of each Federal Reserve
chairperson. The black and grey bars indicates a dominant regime for more than 90% and
75% of chairperson’s tenure time, respectively.
We first note that FFR is causal for output from Burns to Volcker (with the exception
of Miller) and later on during Bernanke-Yellen periods and only during Burns-Miller tenure
for Inflation. There is very little evidence of Taylor type of rule except for the Miller-Volcker
period. Second, DM is indeed the potential policy instrument that is more systematic-
ally linked to macro aggregates. During almost the entirety of the tenures of Martin and
Greenspan, DM was causal for output. DM was also causal in relation to inflation during
Martin-Burns-Miller-Volcker mandates. DM became the relevant feedback variable during
Bernanke-Yellen mandates. We conclude that during most of the sample we study FFR
and DM are instrument substitutes. It appears that the controllable DM is the relevant
monetary variable to describe entire sample studied, whereas FFR is not so much associated
8Table 15 in Appendix (B) shows all the results.
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with the Greenspan period. As seen from the lens of causal leads, the information content
of these two potential instruments switches during the tenures of different Federal Reserve
chairpersons, potentially reflecting changes in policy instrument preferences.
In sum, for models with controllable monetary indicators (FFR and ∆DM models) our
results suggest that two controllable monetary regularly switch in terms of causal usefulness
in explaining variations in inflation and real output. We find that while the DM variations
contain useful information to explain variations in real output and inflation up until the
turn of the century, it became a feedback variable (McCallum rule) post Global Financial
Crisis episodes. Throughout our sample period from 1965 up until end of 2015 DM serves,
without any interruption, as a dominant causal or feedback variable. In contrast, while FFR
served as an intermittent monetary instrument from the 70s to the end of 80s and only
became causal for output during Bernanke-Yellen tenures. In other words, unlike the DM,
during the Greenspan period there is no systematic evidence that favours FFR as a causal or
feedback policy variable to explain variations in US real output and inflation or vice versa.
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FED Chairperson’s Tenure
Martin Burns M
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→
Volcker Greenspan Bernanke
Ye
lle
n
→
Policy 10/65-1/70 4/70-1/78 4/78
7/79
10/79-7/87 10/87-1/06 4/06-1/17
4/14
10/15
Instrument
Output FFR
Regime DM
Inflation FFR
Regime DM
Monetary Rule FFR
Regime DM
Table 5: Dominant Regime
In the diagram, the black and the grey bars indicate that the regime dominates more than 90% and 75% respectively.
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4. Robustness
4.1. Alternative Monetary Indicators
For models with monetary aggregates on which the monetary authority has an indirect
control (Figure 2) we obtain smoothed probabilities with relatively well defined cut offs and
our results broadly agree with the results for the ∆DM model discussed before. In the case
of the ∆M2 model, regime definitions can be separated into two distinct episodes, namely
before and after the Volcker disinflations around 1982. Our calculations suggest that before
1982 monetary policy can be characterized by both output and inflation causality regimes
and after 1982 by feedback regimes.
In the case of the ∆DivisiaM4 model, tenures of all Chairmen before the Volcker dis-
inflations are characterized by output regimes and after Volcker and up until the tenure
of Bernanke by inflation regimes. The model suggests that this composite monetary in-
dicator is one way or another linked to real output and inflation in a temporarily causal
manner throughout, confirming the findings of Belongia and Ireland (2015), but seems to be
non-causal around major events such as the Global Financial Crisis.
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Causal Effect ∆M2 ∆DivisiaM4
pit → yt
ψ
(1)
1
0.1256 3 -0.6010
(0.3380) (0.3804)
ψ
(2)
1
-1.1851*** -0.2826
(0.3118) (0.3549)
mt → yt
ψ
(1)
2
0.5703*** 0.5954***
(0.2470) (0.2114)
ψ
(2)
2
0.5461** 0.3143
(0.2297) (0.2584)
yt → pit
ψ
(1)
3
0.0092 0.0992***
(0.0577) (0.0350)
ψ
(2)
3
0.0949** 0.0230
(0.0435) (0.0425)
mt → pit
ψ
(1)
4
-0.1882*** -0.1178***
(0.0422) (0.0321)
ψ
(2)
4
0.0971** 0.0437*
(0.0389) (0.0318)
yt → mt
ψ
(1)
5
-0.3016*** -0.3069*
(0.0900) (0.1710)
ψ
(2)
5
0.2228** 0.1161
(0.0764) (0.2080)
pit → mt
ψ
(1)
6
-0.4359* -0.0433
(0.2600) (0.4586)
ψ
(2)
6
0.1693 -0.2358
(0.2300) (0.4866)
Note: * , **, *** are respectively 5%, 1% and 0.1% significance
Standard errors in the brackets
Table 6: Results for Causality Parameters
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Figure 2: Smoothed Probabilities for Monetary Information Variables ‘Indicator-Output Regime’ (St = 1, 2, 3, 5), where the relevant
monetary policy indicator causally leads US real output, a ‘Indicator-Inflation Regime’ (St = 1, 2, 4, 6), where the relevant monetary
policy indictor causally leads price inflation, a ‘Monetary Rule Regime’ (St = 1, 3, 4, 7), where US real output and/or price inflation
lead the monetary policy indicator and finally the ‘Non-Causality Regime’ (St = 8) where none of the variables are causally linked
to each other
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FED Chairperson’s Tenure
Martin Burns M
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→
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n
→
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Aggregate
10/65-1/70 4/70-1/78 4/78
7/79
10/79-7/87 10/87-1/06 4/06-1/17
4/14
10/15
Output M2
Regime DM4
Inflation M2
Regime DM4
Monetary M2
Regime DM4
Table 7: Dominant Regime
In Table 7, the black and the grey bars indicate that the regime dominates more than 90% and 75% respectively.
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∆M2 ∆DivisiaM4
Output Regime 63 62
Inflation Regime 57 102
Monetary Rule Regime 149 115
Non-Causality Regime 8 25
Table 8: Number of Quarters Associated with Each Regime
∆M2 ∆DivisiaM4
Output Regime 17.82 49.35
Inflation Regime 13.20 53.19
Monetary Rule Regime 18.48 53.40
Non-Causality Regime 3.66 15.48
Table 9: Conditional Expected Duration (Quarters)
4.2. Monte Carlo Experiments
It is informative to consider the results of Monte Carlo experiments designed to evaluate
the accuracy of regime classification associated with the trivariate model presented in Sec-
tion 2. To ensure that the simulations are empirically relevant, the parameter values used to
generate pseudo-data are the estimates obtained from trivariate models in which the mon-
etary indicator variable is either Domestic Money (∆DM) or M2 (∆M2). In each case, we
generate 500 independent samples of size 255, but only the last T = 205 pseudo-data points
in each sample are used for estimation in order to minimize the effects of initial values.
As a measure of the accuracy of regime classification we use the quantity
C` =
1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣Pˆ(St = `)− I(St = `)∣∣∣ , ` = 1, 2, . . . , 8,
where Pˆ(St = `) is either the filtered probability P(St = `|X1−h, ..., Xt; θˆ) or the smoothed
probability P(St = `|X1−h, ..., XT ; θˆ). Note that 0 ≤ C` ≤ 1 and that low values of C`
imply accurate classification of regimes while high values imply inaccurate classification.
The average values of C` over the 500 Monte Carlo replications, when the estimated model
is correctly specified, are reported in Table 10. The regime classification measure C` has very
low values for all regimes, suggesting that our modelling approach is effective in identifying
temporary causality links.
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8
FFR Model 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.31 0.19 0.28 0.19
Filtered
DM Model 0.19 0.25 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.20 0.12 0.15
M2 Model 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.18 0.10 0.23 0.13
Divisia M4 Model 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.23 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.20
FFR Model 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.31 0.18 0.27 0.18
Smoothed
DM Model 0.18 0.23 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.11 0.14
M2 Model 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.21 0.12
Divisia M4 Model 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.19
Table 10: Regime Classification
In an additional set of simulation experiments, we assess the performance of the model
with three endogenous variables (our model) relative to two somewhat similar models, one
with two endogenous and one conditioning variable (the model considered in Psaradakis et al.
(2005)) and a model with two endogenous variables and no conditioning variable. The aim
is to investigate whether the reduction in the dimension of the model achieved by essentially
omitting one of its equations and treating one variable as exogenous, or omitting the third
variable entirely, has adverse effects on the identification of causality regimes. As before,
pseudo-data are generated according to the estimated three-equation eight-regime models.In
view of the fact that a two-equation model (with or without a conditioning variable) has only
four causality regimes, and in order to make the comparison between bivariate and trivariate
models meaningful, we focus only on the four regimes associated with St = 3, St = 5, St = 7
and St = 8, since these correspond to the four causality regimes of Psaradakis et al. (2005).
The simulation results are displayed in Table 11.
The two-equation model identifies state 1 successfully, but is outperformed by the three-
equation model in the case of all other states. This confirms that treating a variable such as
inflation as endogenous is important for accurately identifying causality regimes.
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C3 = C
∗
1 C5 = C
∗
2 C7 = C
∗
3 C8 = C
∗
4
mt, pi
E
t → yt mt, piEt → yt yt, piEt → mt No Grangeryt, piEt → mt Causality
FFR Model 0.24 0.36 0.42 0.33
Filtered
DM Model 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.29
M2 Model 0.30 0.39 0.26 0.33
Divisia M4 Model 0.20 0.31 0.34 0.30
FFR Model 0.23 0.36 0.43 0.33
Smoothed
DM Model 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.29
M2 Model 0.30 0.38 0.25 0.33
Divisia M4 Model 0.18 0.31 0.35 0.28
C∗ indicates the regimes of Psaradakis et al. (2005). piEt is exogenous
Table 11: Monte Carlo Results
C3 = C
∗
1 C5 = C
∗
2 C7 = C
∗
3 C8 = C
∗
4
mt → yt mt → yt yt → mt No Grangeryt → mt Causality
FFR Model 0.27 0.37 0.42 0.31
Filtered
DM Model 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.30
M2 Model 0.30 0.39 0.26 0.32
Divisia M4 Model 0.19 0.32 0.32 0.31
FFR Model 0.26 0.37 0.42 0.31
Smoothed
DM Model 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.30
M2 Model 0.30 0.38 0.25 0.32
Divisia M4 Model 0.17 0.32 0.33 0.29
C∗ indicates the regimes of Psaradakis et al. (2005). The Exogenous variables is omitted
Table 12: Monte Carlo Results
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The results presented in Table 12 for the bivariate model (with no conditioning/exogenous
variable) suggest that the omitted variable does not affect the identification of causality
regimes adversely when compared to a bivariate model conditioned on the same variable. It
can be seen that the average number of times that the states are identified correctly is very
similar to the averages presented in the Table 11. In terms of identifying causality patterns,
it would seem, therefore, that omitting the inflation equation is not significantly worse than
including inflation as a conditioning variable in a bivariate model, although both approaches
are inferior to using a trivariate model.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigate the nonlinear causal relationships between U.S. real output,
inflation and a monetary indicator. Our analysis is based on a trivariate VAR model whose
parameters are subject to random Markov changes which are directly related to changes in
causality. Our findings suggest that causal relationships between key macroeconomic vari-
ables and potential policy instruments are often associated with tenures of Federal Reserve
Chairpersons.
Our findings suggest that DM and FFR are mostly statistical substitute variables in
explaining variations in U.S. real output associated with tenures of Fed chairpersons. As
for potential policy instruments, FFR and/or DM were useful in predicting inflation from
Martin’s to Volcker’s tenures. We find little evidence of these two as a feedback variable, with
the exception of the Miller and Volcker periods for FFR and the Bernanke-Yellen periods
for DM. Divisia M4, on the other hand, reveals strong monetary policy rule properties
during the Miller-Volcker-Greenspan period. While we cannot conclude that U.S. monetary
policy objectives, instrument preferences, economy-wide inflation or real output expectations
change, when there are changes in the Fed management structure, we provide robust evidence
that the causal relationships do change in conjunction with these appointments.
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A Appendix
1.1. Data Description
-For Domestic Money
• Rest of the world; currency; asset, Level, Millions of Dollars, Quarterly, Not Seasonally
Adjusted - Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (ROWCURQ027S)
• Currency Component of M1, Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted -
Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (CURRSL)
-For Interest rate
• Effective Federal Funds Rate, Percent, Quarterly (End of the Period from Daily -DFF),
Not Seasonally Adjusted - Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (DFF)
• Shadow rates (Estimated): From January of 2009 - Source: Center for quantitative
economic research -Federal Reserve of Atlanta
-For other monetary aggregates
• M2 Money Stock, Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted - Source: FRED,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (M2)
• Divisia M4 - Source: Center for Financial Stability
-For other Macroeconomic aggregates
• Real GDP - Real Gross Domestic Product, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, Quarterly,
Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate -Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(GDPC96) - Vintage: 29/26/2017
• Inflation - Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator, Index 2009=100, Quarterly,
Seasonally Adjusted - Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (GDPDEF)
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B Additional Results
2.1. Temporary Causality
FFR ∆M2 ∆DM ∆DivisiaM4
y
µ10
1.7842*** 1.7800*** 1.7285*** 1.254**
M
ea
n
P
ar
am
et
er
s
(0.4938) (0.3179) (0.5310) (0.4425)
µ11
-0.0753 -0.2585 -0.3617 2.0181
(0.8579) (1.6636) (0.8546) (2.2863)
pi
µ20
0.4093** 0.5236*** 1.1449*** 0.4536
(0.1494) (0.1328) (0.1030) (0.4816)
µ21
-0.6413 0.1715 1.0151** 0.1444
(0.4131) (0.3983) (0.3929) (0.5031)
m
µ30
-0.0183 5.6880*** 3.6201*** 1.9516*
(0.0587) (1.4534) (1.0300) (1.0523)
µ31
-1.5515 -2.9694* 5.9370*** 2.6871
(0.4404) (1.5968) (1.4075) (2.1543)
y
P(1)0,0
0.9726*** 0.9800*** 0.9874*** 0.9750***
T
ra
n
si
ti
on
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
ie
s
(0.4938) (0.0241) (0.0157) (0.0391)
P(1)1,1
0.9587*** 0.9940*** 0.9700*** 0.9871***
(0.8579) (0.0115) (0.0368) (0.0251)
pi
P(2)0,0
0.617*** 0.8258*** 0.9142*** 0.9713***
(0.1494) (0.0797) (0.0439) (0.0310)
P(2)1,1
0.9847*** 0.9295*** 0.8918*** 0.9715***
(0.4131) (0.0359) (0.0684) (0.0345)
m
P(3)0,0
0.9129*** 0.9338*** 0.9421*** 0.9640***
(0.0587) (0.0399) (0.0390) (0.0424)
P(3)1,1
0.7552*** 0.7868*** 0.9613*** 0.9754***
(0.4404) (0.1145) (0.0230) (0.0402)
Note: * , **, *** are respectively5%, 1% and 0.1% significance
Standard errors in the brackets
Table 13: Results for Mean Parameters and Probabilities
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FFR ∆M2 ∆DM ∆DivisiaM4
y
φ
(1)
10
0.1918* 0.2162** -0.0816 0.2558**
A
u
to
re
gr
es
si
ve
P
ar
am
et
er
s
(0.1129) (0.0924) (0.1353) (0.1083)
φ
(1)
11
0.0177 -0.9294*** 0.4038** -0.5266*
(0.1756) (0.1817) (0.1696) (0.2517)
φ
(2)
10
0.3146*** 0.1951* -0.067 0.2899**
(0.0931) (0.0881) (0.1510) (0.1066)
φ
(2)
11
-0.2301 -0.0590 0.1248 -0.3223*
(0.1601) (0.1755) (0.1896) (0.1912)
pi
φ
(1)
20
0.5933*** 0.3838*** 0.0521 0.7292***
(0.0868) (0.0680) (0.0674) (0.1762)
φ
(1)
21
0.1132 0.3201* 0.5444*** -0.2292
(0.2150) (0.1741) (0.1236) (0.2122)
φ
(2)
20
0.2446** 0.3790*** 0.3824*** 0.1399
(0.0940) (0.0595) (0.0378) (0.1454)
φ
(2)
21
0.0738 -0.1464 -0.1068 0.0772
(0.1873) (0.1815) (0.1129) (0.1711)
m
φ
(1)
30
0.4884*** 0.1993 0.0904 0.4918**
(0.0782) (0.2422) (0.1078) (0.2008)
φ
(1)
31
-0.9719*** 0.3641 -0.3616* -0.2647
(0.1599) (0.2542) (0.1835) (0.2504)
φ
(2)
30
-0.0682 0.2884 0.3806*** 0.1773
(0.0527) (0.2147) (0.0950) (0.1461)
φ
(2)
31
-0.3681*** -0.1909 -0.9387*** -0.0097
(0.0967) (0.2201) (0.1176) (0.2068)
Log-likelihood -441.5284 -587.1293 -590.9861 -639.3839
Note: * , **, *** are respectively5%, 1% and 0.1% significance
Standard errors in the brackets
Table 14: Results for Autoregressive Parameters34
2.2. Dominant Regime
FED Chairperson’s Tenure
Policy
Instrument Martin Burns Miller Volcker Greenspan Bernanke Yellen
FFR 72.2% 84.3% 16.6% 78.1% 25.7% 90.6% 100.0%
Output DM 100.0% 28.1% 66.7% 71.9% 83.8% 34.4% 28.6%
Regime M2 100.0% 81.3% 33.3% 18.8% 9.5% 12.5% 0.0%
DM4 83.3% 100.0% 100.0% 21.9% 0.0% 6.5% 0.0%
FFR 55.5% 87.5% 83.3% 34.4% 0.0% 9.4% 0.0%
Inflation DM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 54.1% 34.4% 0.0%
Regime M2 66.7% 62.5% 100.0% 18.8% 5.4% 28.1% 0.0%
DM4 16.7% 21.9% 0.0% 62.5% 82.4% 35.5% 28.8%
FFR 33.3% 62.5% 100.0% 75.0% 55.4% 0.0% 0.0%
Monetary Rule DM 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 40.5% 90.6% 100.0%
Regime M2 77.8% 21.9% 0.0% 56.3% 100.0% 90.6% 100.0%
DM4 0.0% 28.1% 100.0% 84.4% 82.4% 38.7% 14.3%
Table 15: Dominant Regime
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FED Chairperson’s Tenure
Martin Burns M
ill
er
→
Volcker Greenspan Bernanke
Ye
lle
n
→
Policy Instrument Regime 10/65-1/70 4/70-1/78 4/78
7/79
10/79-7/87 10/87-1/06 4/06-1/17
4/14
10/15
FFR
Output
Inflation
Taylor Rule
DM
Output
Inflation
McCallum Rule
Monetary Aggregate Regime 10/65-1/70 4/70-1/78 4/78
7/79
10/79-7/87 10/87-1/06 4/06-1/17
4/14
10/15
M2
Output
Inflation
McCallum Rule
DM4
Output
Inflation
McCallum Rule
Table 16: Dominant Regime
In the diagram, the black and the grey bars indicate that the regime dominates more than 90% and 75% respectively.
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2.3. Regime Separation by Monetary Indicator
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Figure 3: Smoothed Probabilities for Federal Funds Rate
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Figure 4: Smoothed Probabilities for Domestic Money
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Figure 5: Smoothed Probabilities for M2
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Figure 6: Smoothed Probabilities for Divisia M4
2.4. Subsample Granger Causality Tests
As has been indicated throughout the main text, our modelling approach is designed to
handle situations in which conventional full-sample analysis of Granger Causality is inappro-
priate due to causality patterns being different in different subsamples. As further sensitivity
analysis, we now carry out conventional Granger Causality tests in some of the subsamples
identified by our MS-VAR models. The subsamples we focus on are those in which at least
20 consecutive quarters are identified, on the basis of the smoothed regime probabilities, as
belonging to the same regime. In each subsample, the tests are based on a linear VAR model
the order of which is selected by the Akaike information criterion.
The results of the tests can be found in 7, where, for each monetary variable indicated at
the left of the plot, the p-value of a test of no Ganger causality is shown above for each of the
subsamples under consideration. It is clear that the results of conventional causality tests
are consistent with the causality patterns identified through the regime-switching models.
For example, with respect to M2 in the Inflation Regime, the smoothed probabilities indicate
no Granger Causality, which is corroborated by the conventional causality test; in the case
of DM from 1982 to 2000 and for the Output Regime, both the smoothed probabilities and
the conventional test indicate Granger Causality.
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May,68 Jan,72 Aug,75 Mar,79 Oct,82 Jun,86 Jan,90 Aug,93 Mar,97 Oct,00 Jun,04 Jan,08 Aug,11 Mar,15
Date
H0: Non Granger Causality
0.01%%(FFR)
0.01%(Block)
7.55%(FFR)
19.62%(Block)
2.45%(DM)
0.00%(Block)
0.19%(DM)
0.73%(Block)
0.32%%(M2)
0.06%(Block)
0.00%(DM4)
0.00%(Block)
GC Test for FFR
GC Test for DM
GC Test for M2
GC Test for DM4
Output Regime
May,68 Jan,72 Aug,75 Mar,79 Oct,82 Jun,86 Jan,90 Aug,93 Mar,97 Oct,00 Jun,04 Jan,08 Aug,11 Mar,15
Date
H0: Non Granger Causality
0.18%(FFR)
0.38%(Block)
7.07%(DM)
18.75%(Block)
(Non Granger Causality period)59.42%(M2)
26.38%(Block)
0.09%(DM4)
0.09%(Block)
0.12%(DM4)
0.20%(Block)
GC Test for FFR
GC Test for DM
GC Test for M2
GC Test for DM4
Inflation Regime
May,68 Jan,72 Aug,75 Mar,79 Oct,82 Jun,86 Jan,90 Aug,93 Mar,97 Oct,00 Jun,04 Jan,08 Aug,11 Mar,15
Date
H0: Non Granger Causality
0.33%(Block)
2.94%(Block)
0.01%(Block)
1.03%(T) 0.23%(Block)
GC Test for FFR
GC Test for DM
GC Test for M2
GC Test for DM4
Monetary rule Regime
Figure 7: Block Granger Causality Test for all variables. H0 : is for No–Granger Causality and the Blocks were defined according to
the Smoothed Probabilities estimates.
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2.5. Unit Root tests
Variable
∆y ∆pi FFR ∆M2 ∆DM ∆DivisiaM2
Mean 2.85 3.51 -0.02 6.60 6.28 5.43
Standard Deviation 3.29 2.35 1.90 3.44 2.79 4.01
Unit Root Test Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject
[-10.13] [-3.90] [-15.99] [-6.92] [-4.06] [-4.11]
Note: Null of has a Unit root - Rejection rule: P − V alue < 0.05
Table 17: Descriptive Statistics and Unit Root Test
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